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Abstract:  
 
Rising current account deficits and foreign debt levels remain a source of concern for 
international financial markets and policymakers.  Yet, exactly what constitutes an “excessive” 
external deficit or liability position for an economy at any time has not been adequately defined.  
This paper addresses this question by proposing measures of the maximum feasible limits of 
current account deficits and foreign debt levels based on international macroeconomic 
relationships.  It proposes that investment opportunities essentially define the limit of feasibility 
for current account deficits, whereas the capital to output ratio sets the feasible foreign debt to 
GDP limit.  Benchmark estimates of these limits are presented for advanced economies that have 
borrowed heavily since 1990.     
 
 
JEL: F34, F40 
 
 
  
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Current account imbalances and external liability positions across major trading areas have 
changed markedly over recent decades.  Major borrower economies include the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom whose external deficits are funded by 
economies in East Asia, especially Japan, and the European Union.  External deficits and foreign 
debt levels attract considerable attention because of concerns about their implications for 
financial and macroeconomic stability.  In particular, policymakers have worried that deficits and 
debt levels that are sizeable by historical standards are unsustainable because they expose 
countries to sudden shifts in investor sentiment that may affect exchange rates, precipitate 
financial crises and change the pattern of growth.1   
 
International capital reversals of the kind experienced by East Asia in 1997-98 for instance 
imposed short-term economic, social and political costs on countries through large exchange rate 
depreciations, financial distress, higher domestic interest rates, lost output and higher inflation.  
For this reason, external imbalances and debt levels feature prominently in empirical studies of 
the primary causes of currency crises, although to date no consensus exists on their explanatory 
power.2    
 
Concern has also been expressed that large deficit countries are relying too much on foreign 
saving to fund the growth of their capital stocks.  For instance, US Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan (2002) recently commented on this point that: “Countries that have gone down 
that path invariably have run into trouble and so would we.  Eventually, the current account will 
have to be restrained.”   Meanwhile, there is an apparent policy consensus that any economy’s 
external deficit is “excessive” if it approaches 5 per cent of its GDP (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 
1996, Freund 2000 and Summers 2000).   
 
Yet, this rule of thumb has never been justified analytically and seems quite arbitrary in light of 
the potential for larger differences between domestic saving and investment in individual 
economies.  A substantial body of econometric evidence, inspired by Feldstein-Horioka (1980), 
                                                 
1  See International Monetary Fund (2002) and Mann (1999, 2002) and Rogoff (2002). 
2  Berg and Patillo (1998), and Esquival and Larrain (1998), Radelet and Sachs (2000) suggest that external 
imbalances significantly contribute to currency crises, whereas Frankel and Rose (1996), Calvo (2000), Summers 
(2000) and Edwards (2001) conclude the opposite. 
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shows that domestic saving and investment correlations remain higher than would be expected in 
a world characterized by perfect capital mobility.  The corollary is that as capital mobility 
increases with greater financial globalisation, the correlation between saving and investment 
should fall and saving–investment imbalances accordingly rise to levels not previously 
experienced.     
 
Numerous authors (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 1996, and Edwards 2001) have sought to explain 
what external sustainability means by applying precepts of intertemporal analysis.  This has 
involved testing current account movements to see if they meet a solvency requirement founded 
on permanent income approaches to consumption and saving.  However, no study to date has 
focused on investment rather than consumption to define the bounds of external sustainability in 
terms of the maximum size of current account deficits and foreign debt levels relative to GDP, 
nor ascertained an economy’s proximity to such bounds at any particular time. 
  
Interestingly, and contrary to policy perceptions, modern approaches to current account 
determination do not imply deficits, per se, are problematic.  For instance, the intertemporal 
model, based on the saving-investment approach, (Sachs 1981, 1982, Frenkel and Razin 1996, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996 and Makin 2000) proposes that current account imbalances arise 
through the equalization of discrepant expected rates of return on capital across borders and that 
deficits actually enhance economic welfare by raising consumption possibilities and national 
income.    
 
This paper analyses these issues by examining the links between saving, investment, the current 
account, external debt servicing and national income.  It is structured as follows.  Sections 2 and 
3 respectively examine the macroeconomic conditions that define feasible limits for current 
account deficits and foreign debt to GDP levels.  In preview, the theory suggests that the 
quantum of domestic investment opportunities essentially defines the upper feasible limit for 
current account deficits at any time, whereas the capital to output ratio ultimately sets the limit of 
feasibility for the foreign debt to GDP ratio.   Section 4 then ascertains the proximity to feasible 
limits of select advanced economies that have experienced significant external deficits and debt 
levels by comparing actual and estimated feasible limits since 1990.  Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
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2. THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE CAD 
 
The basic solvency condition for an external debtor economy requires that the difference 
between domestic production and consumption plus government spending, )( 111 ++ +−+ tt GCYt , 
be at least sufficient to meet the servicing costs of foreign debt, tFr
*  plus scheduled capital 
repayments.  That is, 
 
tttt FrGCY )()(
*
111 γ+≥+− +++  (1) 
 
where γ , 01 ≥≥ γ , the proportion of loan principal repaid each period, varies according to the 
nature and term of the external liability.  It ranges from unity for one period loans to zero in the 
case of rollover loans, perpetual bonds or equities. 
 
National output exceeds national income in debtor economies according to:   
 
tt
n
t FrYY )(
*
11 γ+−= ++  (2) 
 
where Y is national output and nY  is national income net of debt servicing costs.   
 
Recalling (1), this can be rewritten as 
0)( *111 ≥+−−− +++ tttnt FrGCY γ   (3) 
 
or 01 ≥+ntS    (3a) 
since the left side of (3) defines nS , net national saving after debt servicing. 
 
This fundamental solvency condition has implications for the size of the current account deficit, 
which over any period equates to the economy’s saving-investment imbalance: 
 
SICAD −=  (4) 
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The critical point beyond which insolvency occurs is 01 =+ntS  which suggests the maximum 
feasible current account deficit, MAXCAD , is then simply defined by the present flow of net 
private investment undertaken by profit maximizing firms, 
 
ttMAX ICAD =,  (5) 
 
Figure 1 shows why a CAD solely defined by investment is sustainable.  When 01 =+ntS  at tY , 
private and public consumption plus previous debt servicing exhausts available income.  
However, additional net investment and the associated rise in external liabilities, Ft enables 
higher subsequent production of Yt+1 via a Fisherian investment opportunities frontier.  Of this 
higher output, part is paid abroad as interest, which is geometrically equal to distance r*Ft and 
part as principal, depending on the nature of the borrowing arrangement.   
 
Hence, a CAD defined by investment opportunities alone would prove sustainable if borrowers 
and lenders were well informed.  The corollary of this condition is that an economy’s actual 
CAD will be well under the feasible limit the larger is its net domestic saving.  Indeed, in high 
saving economies, for a given set of productive investment opportunities, private and public 
consumption may well be increased significantly to raise living standards before affecting the 
economy’s external solvency limit. 
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3. THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE DEBT LIMIT   
 
The maximum feasible CAD also suggests an upper bound for an economy’s CAD  that has a 
stock counterpart for foreign debt.   
 
The dynamic equations are: 
 
11 ++ += ttt CADFF  (6) 
11 ++ += ttt IKK  (7) 
 
Let k denote the economy’s capital-output ratio:  
t
t
t Y
K
k =  (8) 
 
Assume dynamic stability is characterized by a stable foreign debt to income ratio: 
 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t F
Y
Y
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Y
F
Y
F 1
1
1
1 +
+
+
+ ==  (9) 
For a given capital to output ratio, 
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Rearranging (7) 
 
1`1 ++ =− ttt IKK  (11) 
 
Substituting (6) into (9), 
 
t
t
1t
1tt FK
KCADF ++ =+  (12) 
 



 −= ++ 1
t
1t
t1t K
KFCAD  (13) 
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( )tt
t
1t
1t KKK
FCAD −= +++ 1  (14) 
 
( )
t
t
tt K
FICAD 111 +++ =  (15) 
 
As ttMAX ICAD =, , it follows that: 
 
t
t
tMAX
t
t
ttMAX K
F
CAD
K
F
ICAD 1,11, )( +++ ==  (16) 
 
Hence, 
 
1=
t
t
K
F
 or tt KF =  (17) 
 
This means that a continuous series of maximum feasible CADs eventually results in foreigners 
having claim to the economy’s entire capital stock.  Consequently, the economy’s external 
solvency limit in terms of its foreign debt to GDP ratio is ultimately equal to k, the capital-output 
ratio. 
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4. BENCHMARK ESTIMATES FOR SELECT ECONOMIES 
 
The foregoing theory suggests straightforward empirical measures for assessing how close 
deficit and indebted economies are to their limit values.  In the case of current account 
imbalances, it implies that, ceteris paribus, economies experiencing external deficits could permit 
external deficits to rise by the extent of their positive net saving.  Put differently, for given 
domestic investment opportunities domestic consumption could increase to eliminate net saving, 
thereby allowing domestic capital accumulation to be fully funded by foreign saving at a rate 
corresponding to the maximum feasible current account deficit.   
 
Charts 1-4 plot estimates of maximum feasible deficits for four advanced economies - Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom - that experienced significant current 
account deficits as a proportion of GDP in the 1990’s.  In the charts, the vertical distance 
between the value of actual deficits and maximum feasible deficits is equivalent to national 
saving, net of income paid abroad.  The actual current account deficit data includes IMF 
estimates, whereas the maximum feasible deficit series ends at 2000 as this is the most recent 
year saving data are available for the four countries on a comparable basis.  The data reveals that 
external deficits recorded over this period were generally well below feasible limits.   
 
The exceptions however were the Australian deficit of 1991, and more notably the New Zealand 
deficits 1991-1992 when recorded deficits exceeded estimated limit values.  As these economies 
suffered major recessions during that period, it is possible that foreign saving temporarily funded 
excess domestic public and private consumption, consistent with the consumption-smoothing 
role that current account deficits may play in the short run3, but from which this paper has largely 
abstracted.   
 
It is also likely that recorded net saving data is understated in advanced economies to the extent 
that national accounting convention treats most public expenditure on education and health as 
consumption.  Yet, such spending may alternatively be perceived as investment in human capital, 
and if re-classified as such in the national accounts, would yield higher estimated measures of  
                                                 
3  See Ghosh and Ostry (1995) and Mansoorian (1998).    
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Data sources:  OECD National Accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2002. 
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Chart 2 - New Zealand
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
pe
r c
en
t o
f G
D
P
cad
cad max
 
 
Data sources:  OECD National Accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2002. 
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Chart 3 - United States
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Data source: OECD National Accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2002. 
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Data source: OECD National Accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2002. 
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national saving.  This would mean recorded saving rates and hence feasible limits would be 
higher than shown in the Figures.  
 
With regards to feasible foreign debt limits, we saw above that these were ultimately determined 
by the capital to output ratio, a readily available statistic for many debtor economies.  For 
advanced economies, the k ratio ranges between 2.5-3, which implies a feasible upper limit for 
the external debt to GDP ratio of approximately 250-300% for advanced economies.  On the 
other hand, emerging economies tend to have lower k ratios, suggesting that their solvency limits 
are accordingly lower.  
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5. QUALIFICATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
This paper has sought to define the feasible limits that current account deficits and external debt 
levels may reach with reference to capital-theoretic variables.  In summary, it suggests that an 
economy’s productive investment opportunities alone set a feasible upper limit for its external 
deficit over any period and that the economy’s capital-output ratio then ultimately sets the 
feasible limit of its foreign debt to GDP ratio.  These boundaries are only broadly indicative 
however and subject to some qualifications.   
 
For instance, by focusing on saving, investment, national income, the capital stock and foreign 
debt, this paper has abstracted from the state of the economy’s financial system and the role that 
it plays as the conduit for channeling domestic and foreign saving to the most productive 
domestic investment opportunities.  In reality however, information problems, such as 
asymmetric information between ultimate borrowers and lenders may prevent the optimal 
allocation of saving.  In turn, this implies the additional income generating capacity of foreign 
funded capital accumulation may not be strong as the pure theory outlined above suggests.   
 
Emerging economies experiencing large external deficits are also more likely to be prone to 
sudden capital flow reversals than advanced economies, if foreign investors perceive the 
financial systems of emerging economies to be poorly developed with weak prudential 
supervision.  In the event of capital flow reversals and associated sharp currency depreciations, 
economies with fragile banking and financial systems would therefore be subject to greater 
macroeconomic strain, as the currency crises in East Asia and Latin America demonstrated.   
 
Nonetheless, the limits proposed above provide a useful means of assessing the proximity of 
actual current account deficits and external debt levels to boundary values, especially for 
advanced economies experiencing intensified financial globalisation and enhanced international 
capital mobility.  New information about the relative feasibility of external positions at any time 
should also allow financial markets to improve exchange rate forecasts and enable policymakers 
to make more informed judgements about the appropriate stance of fiscal and monetary policies.   
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